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Secret War: The Navajo Code Talkers
in Warld War II
ADAM ADKINS

Intelligence is an offensive weapon, one which searches out the
vulnerable points in a nations [sic] armor, which attacks strong
points again and again, until they, too, are made weak. The only
defense against intelligence is security, and no form of security
is more effective or important than communications security.l
Every military commander knows that intelligence is the key to advantage on the battlefield. Knowing what the enemy is doing and will do,
and keeping him from knowing the same about one's own forces is what
wins battles and keeps soldiers alive to fight once again. With superior
intelligence, the well-informed commander can deploy his troops in a
manner that multiplies their battlefield effectiveness. Near-miraculous
victories such as the Battle of Midway in June 1942 are testaments to
the power of intelligence.
The invention of radio and telephone in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries presented new challenges to the military in the
areas of gathering and protecting intelligence. On the positive side, the
new technology transmitted orders to units with a speed and accuracy
unheard of in previous eras when courier, line of sight, or sound methods such as semaphores or bugle calls were used. On the negative side,
since radio signals are a public medium, any receiver that has the capa-
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bility to monitor the frequency in use can intercept any message sent on
that frequency .. Similarly, telephone cable can be tapped. Despite these
drawbacks, proper ~ommunications security is essential to conducting
and winning a battle.
When the United States entered World War II against the Axis powers in December 1941, American commanders were well aware of the necessity for radio and telephone communications security. During the
interwar years, there had been a tremendous advancement in the science of signals decryption. Since their operators had deciphered many
of Japan's diplomatic and military codes, American military commanders
were convinced of the absolute requirement for secure encryption codes.
One obvious and simplistic solution to communications security is
to use a foreign or altered language for sensitive messages. While not a
foolproof strategy, this method has been used many times. For example,
in South Africa during the Boer War, the British occasionally made use
of Latin in their communications to confound the Boers' attempts at
message interception. The drawbacks to this approach are obvious: an
Army would need enough fluent personnel to use the language; however, a well-known language would likely be as recognizable to the enemy. Such drawbacks are less pronounced for some dialects.
In the native languages of North American Indians, the United States
and Canada had an advantage over other belligerents. By virtue of geographical specificity, non-written nature, and the relative dearth ofAmerind speakers compared to English speakers, the languages of the
American Indians were well suited to secret communications. The American military first attempted to use Native American languages for communications in World War I. Not until the Second World War, however,
did America hone and polish the concept to create a weapon of intelligence. Applying knowledge gained from American and Canadian military e~periences in the Great War, the United States Marine Corps trained
a group of Navajos who developed, then refined, an application of their
language as a combat code. The Navajo Code Talkers, as they were
known, became one of the war's few examples of perfect communications security. They were a weapon comparable to a ritle or grenade that
the corps carefully built and refined. The Marines gave the Navajo men
the training and equipment to wage a secret communications war on the
enemy, a war which the enemy could not, and would not, win.
As for the Navajos, they met and exceeded the Marine Corps' expectations. Through the use of their native language, secrecy, and by taking advantage of Japanese shortcomings and failures in communications
intelligence collection, the Navajo Code Talkers provided Marine commanders an essential element of communications security: an unbroken
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oral code they used to win the war in the Pacific. The Marine Corps used
the Navajo Code from the Guadalcanal campaign in 1942 through the
war's end in 1945 to send tens of thousands of messages, without a
single compromised transmission.
The discussion of American Indians in World War II, and the Navajos in particular, is limited .. Alison Bernstein in American Indians in
World War II (1991) provides an excellent description of how the war
affected Native Americans in general, and a good account of how they
overcame decades of prejudice and patronage to join in the war effort
against the Axis. According to Bernstein, once their legal status as members of independent nations was decided in the 1920s, Indians proved
themselves to be far more patriotic than the general populace of the
United States. 2 The Navajo were no exception.
Much more has been written on the Code Talkers. Older established
works, such as Doris Paul's The Navajo Code Talkers (1973), and newer
works, like Sally McClain's Navajo Weapon (1994) provide overviews of
these men and their contributions to the war effort and the United States
Marine Corps.3 While Bernstein, Paul, and McClain offer fair and complete treatment of the subject, there remain other areas open to exploration. For example, the Japanese point of view and the. difficulties the
Marine Corps experienced in recruiting adequate numbers of Navajo
men are two such issues that need further investigation. .
For reasons outlined below, Japanese inquiry is difficult, if not impossible. The lack of both primary and secondary source material severely limits the scholar's ability to conduct research. In order to bring
to light some of the reasons for the Code Talkers's success, I present a
comparison of Japanese intelligence practices with the Code Talkers'
procedures and training. The difficulty that the Marines had in enlisting
an adequate number of qualified men is another rarely explored area;
While Paul devotes some discussion to this topic, she does not cover
other important mechanisms the Corps implemented to cope with the
manpower shortage. If the problems the Marines encountered with recruiting the Navajo had not been addressed in the unorthodox ways in
which they were, the program would not have had its eventual notable
success. Some of the challenges that they faced, and overcame, are recounted herein.
As previously mentioned, the United States first attempted to use
Native American languages during World War I. Toward the war's end, a
memorandum from the commanding officer of the l42nd Infantry recognized the dangers of German eavesdropping on telephone cables. Suspecting that the Germans had tapped the cables used by the unit in their
communications, the officer decided to encode and decode every message sent to ensure secrecy. The primitive encryption methods, however, took too much time for efficient tactical communication. 4
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An enterprising young Kaw (Kansa), Mose Bellmard, is credited
with the idea of making use in October 1918 of the unit's company of
Choctaws to guarantee secure transmissions. He reasoned that the Germans would have no knowledge of Native American languages and proposed to position one speaker on each end of a telephone line. Among
the men in the company, there were twenty-six different Indian languages
or dialects spoken, only four or five of which were ever written. The first
message to use the Choctaw language ordered the night movement of
two companies from one village to another. It was successful, taking the
Germans completely by surprise. For his suggestion, Bellmard received
a promotion to the rank of captain. 5
The Canadian Army also instituted its own program of using Native
American languages for communications. Elmer Jamieson, a Mohawk
from the Six Nations Reservation in Ontario, tired of having his letters to
his family censored by Canadian military authorities, began using his
native Mohawk language in his personal correspondence. When the
censors discovered they could not determine his "code," he was called
in to explain it. The military authorities were apparently impressed with
his method, since he was directed to set up a network with his fellow
Mohawks similar to that organized by Bellmard. 6
These first efforts in using Native American languages exposed inherent problems that the Marine Corps encountered once again almost
thirty years later. Native American languages did not include military
terminology, so euphemisms had to be coined for terms that were not
part of the vocabulary. For example, "big gun" was used as a substitute
for artillery, and "little gun shoot fast" was used for machine gun. A
rudimentary training- program was put into place for the 142nd Infantry,
but the unit's Choctaws did not have the opportunity to thoroughly test
its new system before the Armistice in November 1918. 7
The United States Army revisited the idea in 1940, when the War
Department asked the Bureau ofIndian Affairs (BIA) to recommend thirty
Comanches for Signal Corps work. The Army expanded the program and
. used it intermittently throughout World War II, but there were never
more than 50 Comanches inducted into the Signal Corps for code-talking duties. According to Forrest Kassonovald, a soldier in the Army's
4th Signal Company, the code-talking duties were sporadic and did not
seem significant at the time. "Most of the time, I remember being in
combat, not on the phones."8
The Marine Corps also understood the necessity of secure communications. Knowing that the Marines would be called upon to fight
the Japanese, Major General Clayton Vogel, commanding general,
Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, wanted to have a secure communica-
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tions system for his field commanders. Interested in the Army experiments, he sought permission of General Thomas Holcomb, Marine Corps
Commandant, to investigate the possibility of using coded Indian languages for that purpose. 9
Meanwhile, in Los Angeles, a civil engineer by the name of Philip
Johnston became likewise intrigued by the Army's experiments with the
Comanches. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he contacted the
Marine Corps area Signal Officer with a proposal to use Native American languages for secure battlefield communications. He postulated that
since the Amerindian languages were not written languages, and that
very few whites had ever learned them, that they would be an ideal
medium for communications security. Since he had spent time as a child
on the Navajo reservation, spoke some Navajo, and was familiar with
their ways and culture, his recommendation was to recruit Navajos, rather
than one of the other large tribes, as communications specialists in the
Marine Corps.
The suggestion was interesting enough that Johnston was asked to
provide a demonstration for senior Marine Corps officers. On 28 February 1942, he and four Navajo arrived at Camp Elliott, California, to conduct the test. The Navajo were given a set of sample messages to send,
using their own language. After a short period to prepare equivalents
for military terms that were not a part of the Navajo vocabulary, they
transmitted all of the messages with no appreciable error. 10
Vogel was quite pleased with the demonstration and recommended
to Commandant Holcomb that two hundred Navajos be recruited for duty
as communications technicians. Lt. Colonel Wethered Woodworth, in
consultation with Bureau ofIndian Affairs personnel, recommended that
thirty men be recruited to test the feasibility of the plan. 11 His recommendations were approved, and in May 1942, twenty-nine Navajos arrived at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) in San Diego, California
to begin boot camp.
By no means were all Marine officers convinced of the wisdom of
the program. Many were concerned that they would be essentially "taking orders" from the code talker, to the detriment of their command, or
.that use of a "foreign" language as a combat code would unnessecarily
slow the tempo of communications. Director of Recruiting, Colonel Frank
Halford, was quite succinct in his concerns: "For combat directing offic"
ers to have to depend on an order which is being transmitted and received in a language unknown to any of the operating force renders it of
very doubtful value as a scheme of communication."12
Despite the misgivings of many Marine officers, the first twentynine code talker recruits started boot camp in May. During their twelve
. weeks in the training cycle, the young Navajo men excelled in all aspects of their training, with the result that Recruit Platoon 382 was one
of the best ever to complete recruit training at the MCRD. According to

324

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

OCTOBER 1997

Lt. Colonel George Hall, "This group has done exceptionally well at this
Depot. They are very t~actable, attentive and loyal. At an early date,
they developed an exceptionally high Esprit de Corps .... This group of
29 men is still intact, none has dropped back due to sickness, disciplinary action or lack of ability.... This is unusual. Their progress has been
highly satisfactory."13
While the attitude of the officers at the MCRD was uniformly positive, the impressions of the recruits themselves were more varied in
nature. For the most part, the men did not find boot camp physically
difficult,owing to their experience of living in the harsh Southwestern
desert and the often military-style discipline enforced during their childhood in BIA schools. According to Jimmy King:
I had gone to an Indian school that employed what was ·known
as military discipline. They taught us how to drill,and calisthenics was one of the things that came naturally for me ... I
knew some of the commands that were given and knew how to
drill tactically halfway through boot camp. In that way, I had the
advantage of knowing what to do and how to do it and when. 14
Not all of their experiences were easy, however. In one case, a sergeant
was attempting to teach the men how to box. Being a peaceful people,
they were not familiar with unarmed combat, and the sergeant was not
satisfied with their progress. As a demonstration, he moved down the
line of Navajos, punching each one of them in the face, until he came to
one man who did know how to box. This man, apparently not craving the
same treatment that the other recruits had received, took action in the
proper military method. Knowing that the best defense is a good offense; he punched the sergeant first, ending thedemonstration. 15
After graduating from bobtcamp, the men were sent to Camp Elliott
to begin their training in communications. The circumstances were
strange for all of them, since they had not been told what their exact
duties would be when they enlisted, and they learned no more about
them during their time in boot camp. What they did not realize was that
they would be responsible for the key portions of their own training.
Since there were no Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) that corresponded to what they had been inducted for, there was no training program in place for them. They received very broad general outlines of
how they should construct the code, then were left to do so.
lt is important to note that there is some confusion about how the
recruits originally created the code. Some sources regarding the Navajo
Code Talkers~for example the Japanese daily newspaper Mainichi
Shimbun, in an article by Shibata Kanji-have mistakenly given credit
to the creation of the verbal code to Philip Johnston. 16 This is no doubt
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Figure 1: First twenty-nine Code Talkers' induction at Fort Wingate, New Mexico,
May 1942. Photography courtesy of Milton Snow Collection, Navajo Nation Musuem,
Window Rock, Arizona.

Figure 2: Graduation of the first all Navajo Platoon, United States Marine Corps,
August 1942. Photograph courtesy of Carl and Mary Gorman.
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due to Johnston's statement at the first Navajo Code Talker's Association in 1971' that he had invented the code. Other evidence, however,
proves that it was entirely the creation of the "First 29," with many of
the men giving accounts similar to that given by Cosey Stanley Brown:
Then, we got together and discussed how we would do it. We
decided to change the name of the airplanes, ships and the English ABCs into the Navajo language. We did the changing. [emphasis added] For instance, we named the airplanes "dive
bombers" for ginitsoh (sparrow hawk), because the sparrow
hawk is like an airplane-it charges downward at a very fast
pace .... We changed the English alphabet to the Navajo language, like for the letter T we used tashii (turkey), tsin (stick),
and tliish (snake) in Navajo. We usually used the harmful
animal's [sic] names that were living in our country for the alphabet. Then a name was written on a piece of paper. Some words
were marked off and some were accepted. That was the way we
completed our alphabet which we used against the enemy in our
communications. 17
Even the private papers of Johnston dating from the war years dispute
his claim that he created the code. Despite his later statements, one of
these documents makes clear reference to the fact that "signal personnel at Camp Elliott compiled this code."18Nevertheless, there can be no
doubt where the code originated.
The training lasted about eight weeks, during which the men not
only developed and refined the code, they also learned common messagingprotocol, how to operate radios and run and repair communications cable, and how to send and receive Morse Code. Toward the end
of their training period at Camp Elliott, they were to run into a problem
for the first time that would.be a recurring theme for all Code Talkers
throughout the Pacific War; the security of the program would cause
problems with official organizations that were not informed of their activities.
Because of the nature of their jobs, part of the training had to be
carried out over live radio nets. Since radio waves are available to any
who can receive that frequency, their transmissions were picked up by
other parties, in one case, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).
Since the ONI at the time had no idea about the Navajo program, they
were convinced that the unknown gibberish that they were receiving on
their radios was some type of covert enemy transmission.
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For three weeks the aNI's best analysts worked to decode the transmission, looking for repetition, sequences or patterns with which they
could wrench some meaning out of the message. Finally they went to
Camp Elliott, and John Benally, one of the "First 29" was sent to San
Diego. When he identified the transmission as a practice message, the
aNI analysts must have been rather peeved at their inability to break it
down. They abruptly shut off the recording and told Benally to leave.'9
The first combat posting for the men of the Code Talkers was in the
Solomon Islands. In August 1942, men of the First Marine Division had
stormed ashore at a location called Lunga Point on a small island called
Guadalcanal. They quickly captured the half-completed airfield the Japanese had been building and prepared to defend their position from the'
inevitable counterattacks. By the time the first Code Talkers arrived, the
Marines had been ashore for over two months and had started to feel
the true measure of their opponent, withstanding attack after attack from
the ground, sea, and air. The Navajo arrived on the island with orders to
report to the commanding general.
Since the Marines and officers on Guadalcanal had not been told of
the Code Talkers any more than had aNI, they had no idea how to use
these men and their specialized skills. After touring the island for some
time looking for Major General Alexander Archer Vandegrift, they finally
were assigned to a Signal Corps section. The lieutenant in charge instructed them to send a coded message to demonstrate why they had
been sent to the island.
The transmission of a foreign language on the American frequencies caused a panic on the island. As soon as the Code Talkers sent the
required message, all of the radiomen on the island called in, reporting
that the Japanese had broken into the net and'were using U.S. equipment. It took the lieutenant several hours to calm the tumult. Not believing that what the Code Talkers had demonstrated was not a trick, they
were told to send a message using their code, while another team sent
the same message using the Marine Corps Shackle code. After two minutes, the Navajo men received and signed off the order, while the Shackle
team were still encoding the message. 20
'
The First Marine Division needed no more convincing, nor indeed
did the rest of the Corps. From that point on, the Navajo code was utilized for many routine messages, and for almost all sensitive communications. New procedures were worked out to prevent any more events
such as the first tests at Guadalcanal, to let other communications technicians on a radio or telephone net know that the Navajo code was
going to be used. Before any Code Talker transmission, the talkers would
preface the message with a code word. For example, "Tecumseh,"
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"Hiawatha," "Mukoki," "Wabigoon," and "Montezuma" were the code
words used during the Iwo Jima campaign. Hearing one of these key
words (in English) would alert any American radio operators that the
message that followed was a Navajo Code Talker transmission. 21
The Marines' initial uncertainty with the Navajos' language was
compounded by confusion about the physical differences and similarities between the Navajos and the Japanese. With their dark skin, high
cheekbones and very non-European appearances, some Code Talkers
had near-fatal encounters when white Marines would find one of them
in an unusual situation and mistake them as Japanese.
In one example, just before leaving Guadalcanal, William McCabe
was almost executed as a spy. While waiting for transport to Australia,
McCabe and a few of his fellow Marines were scrounging in the supply
dump for something to eat. He was the last man to find his preferred
victuals and was caught by a sentry. The sentry brought him before the
provost marshal, who almost ordered him shot, but finally ordered the
sentry to find McCabe's unit. In his unit area, several officers and noncommissioned officers vouched for his identity, saving him from a quick
bullet. The Marine Corps, realizing the value of these men and their
language, took steps to protect them. After a few of these occurrences,
the Code Talkers were assigned bodyguards, who were told never to
leave their sides. 22.
In many cases, they never realized that they had bodyguards. Bill
Toledo, a Code Talker in the Third Marine Division, spent most of the
war in the company of Dick Bonham, who was Toledo's assigned bodyguard. It was not until a reunion in 1987 that Toledo realized the specialized task that Bonham performed, besides being his foxhole partner. At
one time, on Guam, Toledo was assigned to run a message to regimental
headquarters when his unit's radio and telephone were knocked out. He
slipped away without being noticed by Bonham, and ori the way to the
headquarters was nearly shot by a Japanese sniper. After delivering the
message and returning to his own unit, Toledo told Bonham about the
incident and was surprised by Bonham's reaction. "You know this is a
very serious thing that happened. If my commander had found out, I
could have gotten court-martialed!" In addition to redoubling his efforts to protect his partner, he took down the name of the sergeant who
had assigned Toledo the task of running the message, presumably to
report the breach of security. Bonham took his duties seriously, and
kept Tole,do under close scrutiny for the rest of the warY
Despite the frequent misunderstandings that ensued between Anglo
and Navajo Marines regarding confusion over appearance, there was
very little tension, racial or otherwise, between the two ethnic groups.
The Navajos had enlisted in the Marines as United States citizens, just
the same as the Anglos had, and demanded and were accorded no special treatment. Unlike black units that were segregated by race, Native
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Americans served with whites in integrated units from the beginning of
the war. Notwithstanding the occasional bigoted white (for example the
drill instructor previously mentioned), Navajos and whites generally got
along. 24
Nonetheless, both groups harbored preconceived notions about each
other that sometimes caused misunderstanding. In large part because of
tales of the "Wild West," Anglos perceived Navajos as being a warlike
people and perhaps a bit more than human. At times the stereotyping
annoyed the Navajos, but they did not always try to dissuade the whites
from the error. Al Mertz, a white Marine who worked extensively with the
Navajo, relates this story of a desert survival hike:
[T]hey were rather proud of themselves for the fact that they
knew how to survive out there. A lot of prickly pear [cactus]
which is very common in some of the drier islands, and they got
both fluids and also sustenance from them. When the Anglos
had reached almost the point of exhaustion, most of the N avajos still had more than half a canteen of water left! Of course,
they didn't share this knowledge until after the point of exhaustion!25
On occasion Navajos would share this knowledge with Anglos with
whom they became particularly close. Mertz also relates a story of one
Navajo's facility with a rifle, describing one of them shooting a small
goat with a carbine far out of its normal accuracy range and then the
man's comment to the cooks as they were cooking the goat that he was
their "survival crew."26 The Navajo soldiers clearly enjoyed this particular aspect of their near-legendary status.
One of the most universal comments made by the Navajos about the
caucasian Marines was the almost 'universal habit of referring to all of
the Navajo men as "Chief' or "Geronimo." Despite the apparent slight,
few of them became angry or offended by such stereotypical comments.
Reactions varied, from Sam Billison's acceptance of the whites' igno-'
rance ofIndian culture, to Harold Foster's pride in their respect of his
ancestors' prowessY
The greatest misunderstandings stemmed from the vast cultural differences and mores that the two ethnic groups,took for granted. The
Navajo are not a belligerent people, historically having made war only
to protect themselves. In many ways, their culture makes them particularly ill-suited for warfare, as they have a fear of death and mutilation,
two common events in war. This kind of cultural background inevitably
collided with the cultural bias that is inherent in military organizations,
especially the Marine Corps.
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Many of the practices and usages common to the Marine Corps
confused and alarmed the Navajo, from the normal procedure in close
order drill to start marching from the left foot (the Navajo would normally start with the right), to washing their own clothes (instead ofhaving women do it), to the way in which drill instructors would belligerently
get "in their face" and shout at them. For some, just getting accustomed
to the colorful and often raw form of military speech caused many problems. They had to learn to respond in kind, so that when someone said
to them, "You damned Indian!" they would not get upset but fire back
with "You damned pale face!"28
The positive results obtained from the "First 29" convinced the
Marine Corps that the Code Talker programs should be quickly expanded.
Two hundred recruits had been authorized by the commandant's approval, and action was taken immediately to fill out the two-hundred
man authorization. While the Corps posted most of the "First 29" to
combat organizations, two of them received promotions to corporal and
returned to the reservation to help recruit more Navajos for the program.
John Benally and Johnny Manuelito were the men chosen to convince
more Navajos to join the Marines and become Code Talkers. 29
Benally and Manuelito faced a difficult challenge in their assignment. They had been ordered to the reservation to act as "public relations" officials for the Marine Corps, and had to promote the Code Talker
program to eligible Navajos who had not already enlisted or been drafted
after the Pearl Harbor attack. Their task was made more difficult in that
they were limited by security injunctions to ensure they would not compromise the program. Eventually, they were allowed to make some reference to the program and its goals, but they were to avoid specifics and
to make clear the confidential nature of what they were telling the prospective inductees. In many cases, however, it was not necessarily the
nature of the assignment, or the allure of joining a highly motivated
group such as the Marines that enticed the young men into the Corps;
rather, the biggest draw was the Marines' dress blue uniform. According
to Kee Etsicitty, who planned on joining the Navy, " ... we were going to
the courthouse in Gallup, New Mexico to sign up [for the Navy] there.
On the way to the courthouse we saw a Marine in dress blues... that
uniform with the brass buttons and the white gloves looked real good
so we signed up with the Marine Corps. "30
The onsite recruiting effort ended after about four months, but the
drive to get more Navajos into the school at Camp Elliott continued. In
fact, recruitment continued to be the single biggest problem encountered in training enough Code Talkers. Major Frank Shannon, commanding officer of the Phoenix recruiting station, spent a significant amount
of time attempting to fulfill the quotas that were assigned to him by the
director of the recruiting division. The guideline that was handed down
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Figure 3: Corporal Joe Vandever and PFC George Kirk on Bougainville, 1943. Photograph courtesy of United States Marine Corps.

from Plans and Procedures was that there should be 442 Navajo men
enlisted as Code Talkers, which would provide each of the four Marine
divisions with eighty-two talkers, with adequate numbers left over for
replacements and other non-divisional commands.
Problems in the procurement of required quotas arose as early as
March 1943. Shannon was instructed to procure twenty-five inductees
per month until the total number of billets had been filled, but was concerned that there would be very few.available men after the first two
hundred had been recruited. His predictions turned out to be true: there
would be concern about the rate of recruitment even into June 1945,
when the Corps were still twenty-two men short of their quotas. 31 The
major problem recruiters faced was the limited number of men available
on the reservation who were qualified for training. Besides being physically sound enough to join the Marines, they had to be fluent enough in
both Navajo and English to be able to switch back and forth between
the languages. There was also a "rule of thumb" that the men had to
have reached at least the tenth grade, in order to guarantee that basic
literacy skills had already been mastered. This stipulation was by no
means a certainty on the reservation at the time, since many of the best
qualified men had already enlisted or been drafted, or had moved away
to work in critical war industries.
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To overcome these problems, several different approaches were
taken. Arrangements were made with the Army Selective Service commands to route any eligible Navajo men to the Marine Corps for training.
This tactic worked well, with the Army cooperating more than was expected, even allowing the Marines to take more than their normal quotas. Other arrangements were made whereby the recruiting stations would
purposely "nudge" Navajo applicants toward the Corps. In some cases
this entailed a bit more than a nudge; many of the men who went to
Camp Elliott reported that if there was a choice in their specialty, they
were not aware of it. They were often told in no uncertain terms that
since they were Navajo, they would be sent to a special program for
testing. Those that failed were then allowed then to choose (as much as
the~Marine Corps allowed) where they would gO.32
Keeping the code current and flexible was also a high priority. As
the Navajos gained experience with the code, they began to improve its
use and security. From the initial vocabulary of 211 words and phrases;
the entire Navajo code talker dictionary grew to 619 terms. Many of the
new words were words· that had been forgotten in the initial development of the code, and substitutes were added for many of the words and
letters that were used frequently. For example, the letter A had two new
terms added for substitution, as did E, T, 0, I, and N. This was done to
further confuse any eavesdroppers and to prevent transmission patterns from being discerned, since discovering patterns and repetitions
is a key to successful cryptography.J3
Training was also necessary to further standardize the code and its
use. Despite the continuous attempts to distribute any changes that
were made to the code, either in the field or in the classroom, the efforts
were not always successful. There were individual nuances in the way
the men used the code, and since they were most often paired with
another man, the team would develop a rhythm. At times, there were
problems communicating between men of different divisions. According
to Peter Sandoval, of the Fourth Marine Division, "if you get to start
talking to someone from earlier divisions, First and Second, then you
have to take it a little slower and sometimes repeat, because the methods they used earlier, have changed and improved somewhat." 34
The field schools established for refresher training provided primary instruction as well, since some of the Navajo were not trained at
Camps Elliott or Pendleton, both in California. As the recruiting division
spread its net throughout the reservation and other states, an internal
search occurred. Some recruits who eventually became Code Talkers
had already joined the Marines and received other training when they
either decided or were told that they would start the program. For them,
there was an intensive field course lasting about four weeks instead of
the usual eight. 35
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Figure 4: Wilsie Bitsie, Eugene Crawford, and Edmund John (left to right), three
Code Talkers, relaxing at Noumea, New Caledonia, n.d. Photograph courtesy of the
National Archives.

The last and most important characteristics of the Code Talkers re- .
volved around secrecy. From the start ·of the Navajo code development
until the end of the 1960s, the program was classified. The men themselves were told in no uncertain terms that what they were learning was
secret information, and that they were to divulge what they did to no
one-families, wives, or sweethearts-under duress of a court martial
and possibly a 'firing squad. Official notification to all commands involved in the program instructed that there was to be no release of
information regarding the pro grain to the press or any other government
organizations, without prior permission.
The'cloak of secrecy extended to senior commanders within the
Corps itself. The men who graduated from the schools in California and
who were in the field were told that they did not have to explain themselves to anyone of lesser rank than-a three-star, (jr lieutenant general.
Any other commanders who asked were to be told, "Well, Mr. So and So,
I hate to tell you this, but I'm not authorized to tell you what the message is about or what that man is saying over the air. And by the way, sir,
what is your name.?" As expected, this type of response did not endear
the private or corporal to the colonel or general that they might have
spoken to, but there was never any backlash against the Code Talkers
for following this directive. 36
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There were two occasions during the war when the security of the
program was compromised, and both occurred in the United States. In
June 1943, Arizona Highways, a monthly periodical, published a story
by James M. Stewart, the general superintendent (Navajo Indian Service) of the Navajo Reservation. The story gave a very concise outline
of the Marines' efforts to convert Navajo to code for secure communications. Stewart mentioned John Benally and Johnny Manuelito by name,
stating that they were on the reservation to explain the program to eligible Indians. 37
The appearance of the Arizona Highways article caused a furor over
the security breach. All of the people involved in the program that may
have had contact with Stewart were interviewed and gave depositions
about their knowledge of the article. Without exception, all involved
denied accountability for the leak. Frank Shannon and Philip Johnston
used their depositions to "point fingers" at one anther: Johnston stating that he did not understand why Shannon, a senior officer, would
compromise the program; and Shannon noting that Johnston had been
on the reservation previous to the article's publication and that he was
also a writer. Benally was also interviewed and stated that he believed it
possible that the information may have come from a prospective recruit
who did not adequately safeguard the information. In the end, the case
was closed with no disciplinary action indicated, the belief being that
the letter of reprimand in each man's service jacket was adequate. 38
In the second crisis, the cause of the breach was far easier to determine. In March 1944, a letter prepared by the legal firm Wheat and May
was delivered to Army Colonel William Friedman, explaining in detail a
Marine Corps program that utilized Navajo Indians to transmit coded
messages in the South Pacific. The letter had been prepared at the request of Johnston, who was offering his services to the Army to provide
a program similar to that of the Marine Corps. In his proposal to the
Army, he outlined the capabilities of the school at Camp Pendleton, and
suggested a plan of action to start an Army Code Talker program.
The Army's response was lukewarm, at best. Records show that the
Wheat and May letter was circulated through several Army commands,
and the reply from each command was essentially the same. The reply
from Major J.M. Marzolf, chief of the cryptographic branch for the United
States Army Air Forces, is indicative of the Army's opinion in general of
the plan:
Although the plan has a certain amount of merit as a "stopgap" or an emergency system of communication, this Headquarters feels that the low-grade security afforded by such a plan
would be dangerous to the operations of the AAF, whereas authorized War Department cryptographic systems offer better
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security than the recommended procedure. It is felt that there
are too many "loop-holes" in the plan to justify its usage by
the AAF.39
While the Army rejected Johnston's plan, the Marine Corps did its
best to "soft pedal" the matter, by offering bland and evasive responses
to queries posed by the Army during a meeting regarding Johnston's
proposal to the Army at the Arlington Annex.
While Johnston's spirit of public service was laudable, his judgement was faulty. After the Arizona Highways incident, the Marine command structure was unlikely to forgive any further transgressions, and
seemingly this was the case with Johnston. Since he had been awarded
a special enlistment as a Tech Sergeant in the Marine Reserves, they
had the power to discipline him as they would. While official records of
his fate as a result of this event were .not available, a recollection by
Paul Blatchford gives some insight as to Johnston's future. Blatchford
had been selected to go to the school at Camp Pendleton to be an instructor for the Code Talkers.
So when we were going back the sergeant was telling me that
they wanted to get rid of the "Old Man," the Old' Man that's
running the school. ... When I got over there they introduced
me to Philip Johnston and he acted like he didn't even want to
talk to me. He just looked the other way and shook me off. ...
Shortly after that he disappeared from the school and I never
saw him again. 40
After the Wheat and May letter, there were no mo·re security breaches.
Designed for communications security, the Navajo code provides
various examples of the ironclad secrecy that characterized its use. Originally conceived as a tactical weapon, i.e., one that was intended for use
by commanders and Marines on the battlefield, the code became known
as reliable ,and secure enough that it saw occasional use in a more strategic role. It was, for example, used to transmit top secret information'
from Tokyo to the United States regarding the effects of the atomic
bomb strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 41
The Code Talkers were vital to transmitting messages that had to
remain out of enemy hands. Many messages would almost surely invite
an attack on the section of the line sending the report; for example, a
report th<:lt ammunition was running low and resupply was necessary.
The Japanese could easily identify the location of radio transmissions
by triangulation and attack there, so keeping the message content confidential was essential. For example, Bill Toledo had a narrow escape
from Japanese mortars, after enemy direction finding equipment had uncovered his location. "I had received the warning message and passed it
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along to the rear units, shut off my radio and only moved about ten
yards when a mortar hit the exact spot I had transmitted from .... We
were told that the Japanese had very good tracking equipment and could
pinpoint the location of radio signals and deliver a strike to that location. "42
The Navajos were also a godsend to men who were attacking, as
Harold Foster relates. During an attack on Hill 362A on Iwo Jima, three
companies (units consisting of about one hundred men) were making an
assault up the face of the hill. "We called for one of the jeeps that had
rocket launchers on it. Giving the position was done in code, where the
jeep was supposed to stop and direct the fire .... After they lifted the
artillery we called in for the flame throwers. I didn't think about it then,
but now I know how many lives I saved calling in that artillery using the
code." The speed of the Navajo code prevented any delays in zeroing
the artillery fire that might have meant disaster for the attacking companies. A sergeant told Foster, "Chief, you saved the company."43
There were other ways that the Marines were fortunate to have the
Navajo on their side. In any technological war, there are times that orders will become confused, and a unit's weapons, usually artillery, may
be turned on its own, commonly called friendly fire. Invariably, when
troops find themselves under friendly fire, they immediately get on the
radio or telephone to demand that the shelling stop. Since the enemy
can easily get an English speaker on the proper radio frequencies, commanders are understandably reluctant to lift the fire for a non-coded
radio message. Unfortunately, normal enciphered coding usually takes
too long to save the men under fire.
For these situations the Code Talkers were peerless. In one example,
Dan Akee, a Navajo who had originally joined the Corps to become a
paratrooper, was part of an advancing group of Marines: "And we went
too far beyond the enemy line there. And we were getting shelled from
our own artillery, and from the other side we were being machine-gunned
by the enemy. Right there they told me to send the message, and quick.
. . . And I think it was worth the lives to choose this, Code Talker, instead
of paratrooper. ~'44
The power of their communications secrecy was not only limited to
the Marine Corps. In early 1944, Naval Air in the South Pacific had been
taking heavy losses due to Japanese interception of radio transmissions
regarding American air strikes in the Solomon Islands. Desperate to reduce the hemorrhage in planes and pilots that was occuring, the Navy
sought a·remedy. Aware of the Code Talkers as a result of the Navajo
workirig with Navy communications personnel during the island campaigns, Lt. Commander R.L. Hird, commander air, South Pacific, requested
ten Code Talkers be assigned for temporary duty to the Navy. The Marines approved the request, and the ten men reported to work on the
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radio nets in the Solomons, once again proving the value of the code.
Within a short time, the number of plane losses and pilot fatalities
dropped dramatically, with the latter falling from 53 percent to less than
7 percent. 45
The contributions of the Code Talkers did not end with the war.
With the suspension of hostilities between the United States and Japan,
the Marines who did not have enough "points" to be rotated home were
assigned to other necessary chores, such as occupation duty. Many of
the Navajo did not have adequate points to be discharged, and so were
sent to postwar Japan to assist in the disarmament of the Japanese nation and people. Some continued their communications duties, transmitting secret messages between Tokyo and San Francisco, as previously
mentioned.
The Fourth MarineDivision was sent to China after hostilities ceased,
and several of the Code Talkers went along. Their duties in China were
similar to those in Japan, i.e., keeping the peace, but were not limited to
that role exclusively. They used the code in China as well, although not
nearly to the extent that they had in action against the Japanese. According to James T. Nahkai, "Yeah, we were still Code'Talkers in China .
. . . We still sent messages. Not as many, maybe itwas cutin half."46
The effectiveness of the Navajo code is unquestioned. Source after
source reveals that it was never compromised. Such unqualified success leads the reader to wonder why this was so. After all, forging and
using a weapon is only half of the story. The other half depends on
enemy weaknesses that allow the utilization of the new weapon. The
Japanese military, despite their war-making ability, possessed serious
deficiencies that when matched against the Navajo code resulted in guaranteed security for Marine Corps tactical communications.
The most obvious problem the Japanese had in countering the Code·
Talkers was their total unfamiliarity with the Navajo language. Part of
Johnston's contention in his letter to the Marine Corps in 1942 was that
Navajo was a language that was well-known only to the Navajo themselves. This was true. For unknown reasons, German and Japanese
anthropologists, who had studied many of the American Indian tribes
and their languages in the years between the World Wars, had missed
the Navajo.47
The nature of the Navajo language also makes it very difficult to
learn to speak well if the speaker is not born to the tongue. The morphology of the language is exceedingly complex, and this difficulty is compounded by the fact that its phonology is equally intricate. Navajo is a .
tonal language, like Chinese, with four different tones that convey different meanings for the same word. Additionally, nasals, vowel duration, glottal stops and gutturals must all be spoken precisely to properly
communicate. While the phonology is difficult, however, the real complexity of the language is in the verbs. Navajo verbs have different forms
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for tenses, objects, and situations. For instance, the speaker must make
a distinction between dropping a round object or dropping a cylindrical
object, and whether it is done just one time or habitually. For these
reasons, it is very rare for a non-Navajo to be able to speak the language fluently. Even Johnston, who spent years on the reservation as a
child and young adult, was ridiculed by the trainees at the Code Talker
school for his poor diction and sloppy command of the language. 48
The question of how Japanese intelligence reacted to the appearance of an unknown, unbreakable code remains. While it would be convenient to be able to produce documented fact about their reaction, it is
unfortunately impossible. On II August 1945, the last commander of the
Chuo tokujobu (Central Bureau of Signal Intelligence), Major General
Nishimura Toshio ordered the incineration of all secret documents. For
days his underlings worked, burning all of the relevant documents of
the unit. Additionally, the names of the leading intelligence officers were
expunged from War Ministry listings, and most of the rest went underground to avoid arrest during the occupation. 49 Therefore, all that can
be done is to reconstruct the way the Japanese ran their intelligence
organ in an attempt to further explain Navajo success.
The Japanese intelligence effort suffered several disadvantages from
the beginning of the war through the final surrender. Throughout the
Empire, a cavalier attitude toward gathering signals or communications
intelligence permeated the Japanese armed forces and diplomatic and
government corps. The Army and Navy always emphasised sakusen, or
combat operations. The best of Japan's officer corps were invariably
assigned to operational combat units, to engineer and participate in
great sweeping battles and honorably annihilate the enemy. Intelligence
organizations received the second best, and even at times those men
who were not wanted in other units. The number of men assigned to
intelligence sections tells the story with startling clarity: at the beginning of the war, the Imperial Army's Chief of Staff had only seventeen
staff officers in his command, and forty-nine other officers attached for
general duty. Of those forty-nine, only twenty-seven were assigned to
the directorate responsible for gathering intelligence on the United
States, England, and the Pacific areas. The Navy's situation was similarly woeful, with only ninety-seven staff officers at the end of the war,
most of whom were fresh Imperial Naval Academy graduates assigned
to those billets due to the lack of ships.50
What intelligence effort existed had been historically tailored toward an Asian mainland war with Russia. For instance, the Kwantung
Area Army was much better prepared than other Asian Armies in the
realms of both signal and human intelligence, such as interrogation and
espionage. Despite their advantages, even the Kwantung Army had only

ADAM ADKINS

339

Figure 5: Pencil sketch by Code Talker Teddy Draper, 1994. Photograph courtesy of
Books Beyond Borders.

limited success in their code-breaking efforts. They were routinely able
to break Nationalist Chinese codes, but for most of the war the Communist Chinese and Russian codes were beyond their ability to break with
any meaningful regularity.51
An extremely insular and inefficient reporting system further handicapped the Japanese. The Army and Navy had separate intelligence commands, and real cooperation was rare. For example, if an officer in one
command felt that it would be advantageous for one of his counterparts
in the other service to have access to data, he would arrange it on his
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own recognizance; it was not a standard operating procedure. Any reports that were forwarded were likely to be quite stale since the normal
reporting period was only once every ten days for front line intelligence
reports. 52
Some authors; including Paul', contend that the Japanese were extremely skilled in breaking codes and that American communications
were an "open book," to be perused at the enemy's leisure. The evidentiary record proves the opposite, however, since the Japanese clearly
were not masters of code breaking. Their best performance came at Nationalist Chinese expense as previously noted, with a success rate of up
to 80 percent. This was an unusually high figure when compared with
their usual track record. When reviewing their efforts against United
States codes, their score becomes considerably less stellar. The only
code that the Japanese were able to crack consistently was the BAMS
(Broadcasting Allied Merchant Shipping) code. They achieved this success through a German-supplied code key that enabled them to attain a
50 percent decode rate. By war's end, they had achieved inconsistent
success with some Army Air Corps and Naval Air operational codes.
The only real guarantee of consistent decoding was to capture code
books with unchanged codes. In the words of Major Hori Eizo, "It certainly would have been a wonderful advantage [breaking US codes], but
unfortunately it did not happen .... Yes, it was all done by hand. It was,
for Japan, an 'abacus war. "'53
That is not to say that the Japanese did not know how to use United
States radio transmissions to gain valuable information. Most of the
data that the Japanese obtained from United States sources came from
message traffic analysis and clear.langmige transmissions. In their traffic analysis, the frequency and locations of the messages were analyzed
to gain intelligence and any available call signs. With careful analysis,
the Japanese were able to score some stunning intelligence coups, such
as predicting the expected dates and locations of Operation Coronet
(the planned invasion of Kyushu) with such accuracy that after the war
United States investigators were convinced that they had access to the
plans. 54
The resourceful use of clear language transmissions cannot be overlooked and provided the raison d'etre for the Code Talkers. During the
invasion of Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands, Japanese radiomen on a small
islet called Makin, just offshore of Tarawa, demonstrated how effective
this approach could be. They were able to ascertain the extent of a ship's
damage, oncoming reinforcements, and the desperation of American
forces battling Japanese defenders by virtue of eavesdropping on United
States radio frequencies. 55 Since these were all uncoded transmissions,
they allowed the Japanese commander access to information that normally he would have had to gather by other means.
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After the Code Talkers appeared, there was no further worry of compromise. When Japanese forces could not break the code and with no
other options, they attempted to overwhelm the radio nets with noise,
whistling, singing, or any other available method. The usual Marine
response to this was "Aw, get the hell off, Tojo." Since the Japanese
frequently attempted these ploys, the Navajo devised a counter to the
noise tactic: they would begin transmitting a dummy message in Morse
Code over one frequency, and when that transmission was well along,
would send the real message in Navjo code over another frequency.56
-Denied the ability to break the code, one can assume that the Japanese turned to other sources that they habitually relied upon for information about the United States and its war effort, namely the civilian
radio broadcasts and civilian newspapers. Of course, with the program
being secret, and no publicity to any source being allowed (with the
notable exception of the Arizona Highways article), no information was
available from these sources. There was one other potential intelligence
source for the Japanese-a Navajo prisoner of war (POW). Unfortunately for the Imperial Army, they never captured any Code Talkers.
The POW,Joe Keiyoomia, was an Army soldier who had been captured when the Japanese overran the Philippines. Keiyoomia was sent
to several POW camps before ending up at a Japanese communications
center in Matishuma, south of Nagasaki. While at the camp, he was
forced to listen to recordings of the Code Talkers, and asked repeatedly,
under torture, what the transmissions meant. Since Keiyoomia had never
even heard of the program or the school at Camp Elliott, he had no idea
what the messages were attempting to convey. "When they first made
me listen to the broadcasts, I could not believe what I was hearing! It
sounded like Navajo, just not anything that made sense to me." Despite
the fact that he could recognize some of the code words, for example
"planes" (air force, in the Navajo code) and "ships" (sea force), the
code always eluded him; His knowledge of Navajo may have been the
one thing that kepthim alive, since "They were trying to keep me alive,
trying to get something out of me." Without the knowledge of the code
devised by the "First 29," Keiyoomia was unable to shed any more light
-upon the matter for the Japanese, and they remained ignorant of the
secret. 57
-Notwithstanding the suffering that Keiyoomia endured in his futile
attempts to break the Navajo code, perhaps the most revealing fact about
the inadequacies of the Imperial Japanese intelligence apparatus is their
basic disinterest in voice codes.-The agonizingly long interrogation of
Keiyoomia was probably only one of a few efforts to break the code.
According to Nagata Junko, Japan's leading authority on the Code Talkers, just using the Navajo language, without encoding, would have been
nearly as effective as the form that was used since no Japanese could
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speak Navajo and little emphasis was placed on voice codes. He also
believes that the Code Talkers had a negative effect on Japanese armed
forces morale, and that there was little likelihood that their intelligence
corps could have ever broken the code. 58
Another expert on Japanese intelligence, Alvin Coox, states the same
belief and enlarges the point. Having interviewed over four hundred
Japanese military and government officials about the Pacific War and
intelligence matters from the 1950s to the 1980s, Coox never encountered a single individual who mentioned the Code Talkers or their undecipherable transmissions. 59
The end of the war brought with it the end for the necessity of the
Navajo code. While there were times after the war when the code was
used, such as damage reports from the atomic bomb strikes at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki and occasional use of the code in China, there was generally no further need for the Code Talkers in the Marine Corps. Along
with the majority of other American servicemen at the end of World War
II, the Navajo were discharged as soon as they had the correct number
of points, and they returned home.
Upon arrival, they faced the same difficulties with which all discharged veterans had to contend. Although the war was over, the security of the Code Talker program remained intact. Consequently, many of
them suffered from nightmares and depression and were denied much of
the therapeutic advantage of talking about what they did. The men were
told before they left the service that they were not to discuss the program, and that all the security strictures that had restricted publicity of
the program during the war remained in place. Many of them had ritual
dances performed for them, such as the Squaw Dance or the Gourd Dance,
that helped them to shed their demons. And regardless of what the Marine Corps told them, some such as Jimmie Gleason did as soldiers have
always done,they talked to their wives about their experiences. 6o
The returning veterans also had problems returning to reservation
life and the obsolete Indian policies of the Bureau ofIndian Affairs and
local authorities. During their service years, they had become the social
equals of Anglos in the military and had all of the rights that other
soldiers had-to drink when they wished, vote, and take advantage of
all of the rights and privileges of a United States citizen. When they
came back to the reservation, however, they had to contend with vastly
reduced income, unemployment, and the old limitations on Indian civil
rights. Since the nineteenth century, Indians were legally unable to acquire or consume alcohol on reservation lands or to vote in Arizona and
New Mexico. Another restriction that severely impacted some of the
Navajo was the inability to get grazing rights for new herds, a result of
the Stock Reduction program of 1940. The program effectively prevented
anyone who did not have a herd from ever attaining one.

ADAM ADKINS

343

These limitations were not to stand for long. Among the new skills
and attitudes the returning veterans brought back with them was a new
leadership style that they used on behalf of the tribe. Largely as a result
of their new confidence and exposure in the Anglo world, the Navajo
(and other Indian tribes as well) began to take steps to remedy the inequities. The Navajo brought lawsuits against the BIA and other local and
federal organizations, to remove the antiquated and misguided regulations that had bedeviled the tribe for so many years. By 1948, they had
the right to vote in all local, state, and federal elections. Other issues,
such as land ownership and transfer, were addressed and solved. Their
record of correcting the old injustices, however, reveals only mixed results. Some issues remain problematic: high unemployment, low pay,
and the still extant ban on alcohol in any form on the Navajo Reservation. 61
Many of the Code Talkers made use of their Veteran's Administration (VA) benefits to improve their education and their status. Before
their enlistment in the Marine Corps, very few of them had attended
college. The VA funds provided educational opportunities in ways they
did not possess prior to the war. Some went on to advanced education;
Sam Billison became the first Native American to receive a Doctorate of
Education from Arizona State University. Along with their .education
came greater community responsibilities and new accomplishments in
politics, education, and business. 62
One recognition that eluded them for many years was that of their
role in World War II, as Code Talkers. The men themselves had kept
quiet about their duties in the war, and for twenty-four years there was
no acknowledgment of them. It was not until 1969, during a reunion of
the Fourth Marine Division in Chicago that the public became aware of
the Code Talkers. Lee Cannon, one of the organizers who was aware of
the Navajos' contribution to the war effort, suggested that the honorees
for that year's function should be the Navajo veterans. The organizing
committee approved his suggestion, and he set about to bring public
awareness to Code Talkers. It was due in large part to Cannon's efforts
to recognize these men that the secret of the Navajo code was finally
revealed. Unaware that there were security restrictions, his efforts
brought to light much of the information about the program that had
previously been restricted. A group of Code Talkers was recognized at
the reunion in Chicago and presented with specially designed medallions to commemorate their contributions. For the first time since the
end of the war, they received public celebration and recognition. 63
Shortly after the 1969 reunion, Johnston presented his Code Talker
related papers to the Navajo Tribal Museum in Window Rock, Arizona.
The curator of the museum showed the papers to the staff of the Doris
Duke Indian Oral History project, with the recommendation that the men
be interviewed for the project. With the assistance of the museum, sixty-
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nine of the surviving Code Talkers were reunited on 9-10 July 1971 and
formed the Navajo Code Talkers Association. After the formation of the
Association, they participated in many community events, such as parades and public speaking, and by doing so further spread the story of
Navajo soldiers and their activities during the war. 64
The formation of the Association and their public activities brought
the accomplishments of the Navajo Code Talkers into the public eye.
Subsequently, they received official recognition on several occasions
from the federal government and once from a foreign government. In
1981, the Marine Corps, in their first and only official acknowledgment,
formed another "All Navajo" platoon, in recognition of the "First 29"
that entered boot camp in 1942. Many of the men in the new, 1981 platoon were relatives of the original 1942 platoon. The United States Congress designated 14 August 1982 as National Navajo Code Talkers Day.
In 1993 an historical exhibit was opened in the Pentagon, and in 1994 the
government of the Northern Mariana Islands honored the Code Taikers. 65
Official acknowledgment of the Navajo Code Talkers' contributions
helped to ease the hurt of being ignored for twenty-four years, but did
not entirely remove it. Still eager to have the Marine Corps make a stronger statement in recognition of their contributions, one of the Code
Talkers, Thomas Begay, says what most, if not all, of the veterans wish
for: "We have all kinds of battle scars, but I don't think we got enough
recognition. We did our part, we saved lives, but hardly any of us rose
above the rank of PFC. Other language specialists were Staff Sergeant,
but not us. It didn't turn out to be very fair."66
In today's world of micro-burst transmissions, frequency agile radios, and 128-bit encryption keys, the Navajo code may seem to some
observers to be hopelessly antiquated and obsolete, very much like the
ice boxes of the same era. There is almost no possibility that such a code
could be used today to effectively safeguard communications. At the
time that it was used, however, it was not only effective, it was the best
combat code that the United States Armed Forces possessed. No other
ciphers in use by Allied forces could match the speed, precision, and.
effective security of the Navajo code.
The Navajo Code Talkers fulfilled the promise of Clayton Vogel's
and Philip Johnston's ideas. The program was intended to wage a communications war on the Japanese, bring confusion and uncertainty to
the enemy~s commanders, and guarantee the security of American messages. Without doubt the Code Talkers accomplished this, and they
became the new weapon that the Marine Corps envisioned when the
program began in 1942. By bringing the advantages of specialized train-
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ing and expertise against the shortcomings of the Japanese, the Code
Talkers used their advantage to the greatest extent possible and ensured the success and safety of Marine Corps operations throughout
the South Pacific campaigns.
The combat effectiveness of the Navajos was nothing short of exemplary. Besides being excellent general duty Marines, they successfully brought a human weapon forged through recruitment and training
to bear upon the Japanese in a way in which the enemy could not respond. From the time that the first Code Talkers arrived on Gaudalcanal
in October 1942 until the Japanese signed the Articles of Surrender on
the USS Missouri in 1945, they gave the Marine Corps the advantage of
a code that was never broken in combat, or indeed, e\(er broken at all.
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